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MEN OF GREAT AND LITTLE FAITH: GENERATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS*
ALFRED

S.

KoNEFKY**

In the fall of 1980, at the annual meeting of the American Society for Legal History, one of those periodic, obligatory academic
* This article was originally delivered on May 4, 1981 as the 10th Annual Samuel J.
Konefsky Lecture, Brooklyn College, City University of New York.
I would like to acknowledge a number of people whose insights and criticisms helped
shape the piece: James B. Atleson, Jerold S. Auerbach, Dianne Avery, Richard Ellis, Alan
Freeman, Morton J. Horwitz, Jack Hyman, Al Katz, Elizabeth Mensch, Richard Parker and
John Henry Schlegel, most of whom are members of the intellectual community of the
Buffalo Law School, and whose demanding standards result, in a peculiar manner, in
fashioning an intensely supportive environment. In addition, Melanie Cyganowski provided
valuable research assistance.
A final personal note: I am the son of Samuel J. Konefsky, in whose name Brooklyn
College established the lecture series in 1971. Except for several visits at other institutions,
my father spent thirty-three years teaching constitutional law in the political science
department at Brooklyn College. During that time, he wrote four books: CHIEF JUSTICE
STONE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1945); THE CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD OF MR. JusTIcE
FRANKFURTER (1949); THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS: A STUDY IN THE INFLUENCE OF
IDEAS (1956); and JOHN MARSHALL AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON: ARCHITECTS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1964). He accomplished all this after having arrived in America in 1926 at

the age of eleven, illiterate, and also blind as a result of an accident that occurred while
emigrating to this country. A brief eleven years later he graduated from Brooklyn College,
and was hired immediately there to begin teaching political science. Needless to say,
grappling with his legacy has been my central preoccupation for a time, at the very least
since his death in 1970. It helps explain why someone primarily interested in nineteenth
century American legal history turned to this topic for the lecture. I hope this piece proves
as helpful for others because of its intellectual content and themes, as it was cathartic for
me. The original opening of the lecture read as follows:
I have sat here in the past listening to people begin this lecture by saying
very nice things about my father. And I quietly wondered what it is that I
should say about my father-a very heavy burden, that, I might add, has been
plaguing me for a decade. So I decided to make it brief-and only say that he
was by far the best teacher I ever had, that I learned more from him than I have
from anyone else, and that almost all the formal education I got from him was
around the dinner table, mostly by disagreeing with him. He had a very
sagacious mind and was, from my perspective, infuriatingly patient. We
disagreed about almost everything-sometimes, but not always, thoroughly
irrationally on my part. I guess that's the nature of fathers and sons and in a
sense, what I have to say tonight is about him and about me.
** Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of
New York at Buffalo; B.A. 1967, Columbia; J.D. 1970, Boston College.
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stock-takings occurred with the type of title we all recognize as familiar from the late 1960's and 1970's-this one was called, more
or less, "Is Constitutional Law/History Dead?" ' The panel obviously was designed to reassure all of us that the discipline was
alive and well and thriving, but the less than vigorous performances of the participants belied this assertion. The presentations
were, for the most part, narrow and pedantic. There was little animation and, saddest of all, few ideas. I left with the conclusion that
if there had once been a golden era of constitutional law, it was
easy to understand why it still shines so brightly when compared
to today's dialogue.
My consideration of the past and present state of constitutional scholarship must begin with the people who fostered the
ideas that resulted in this glowing image of the early scholarship. I
have decided to focus on seven people (my father, the eighth, is
included by implication)-all constitutional scholars, all born in
the early part of this century or before-who made significant and
lasting contributions to constitutional law and constitutional history. By examining their backgrounds and personal histories and
the relationship of those characteristics to the ideas they pursued
and communicated, and then by comparing that substantial body
of work to our current plight, I think we can begin to grasp why
today's scholarship seems so unsubstantial.
Let me begin with an exercise in collective biography. I will
look at two groups: first, a group of four political scientists, all
born in the last quarter of the nineteenth century in the United
States, and second, a group of three law professors, two of them
born in this century, one in the last century, all three of them Jewish immigrants. The political scientists are Edward Corwin,
Charles Grove Haines, Alpheus T. Mason, and Carl Swisher. All
were prominent in their time, but their identities are lost to all but
the handful of constitutional history fanatics that remain today.
The law professors are Felix Frankfurter, Alexander Bickel, and
1. Harry Scheiber points out that "[w]hen the final program was prepared ... the
more cautious title 'The Crisis in American Constitutional History and Public Law' was
adopted." Scheiber, one of the participants on the panel, contends that "there is little reason to proclaim or even seriously debate the 'death' of that field." His published article is, if
my recollection serves me, a somewhat expanded version of his original panel talk. It was by
far the best of the lot. See Scheiber, American ConstitutionalHistory and the New Legal
History: Complementary Themes in Two Modes, 68 J. AM. HisT. 337, 337 n.1 (1981).

CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS
Gerald Gunther. There are generational as well as other differences
between the two groups, but in many ways, the two younger immigrants built their careers on the intellectual legacy left by the earlier generation of both constitutional lawyers and political scientists. There are also intellectual differences, to be sure, within the
groups. While not entirely monolithic, they represent two relatively
cohesive fronts for examination. An understanding of the shared
experiences of the men in these two groups helps formulate a theory about why each thought in the manner they did, when they
did.
I.
What are the backgrounds and common experiences of the political scientists? 2 First, all of them, born between 1878 and 1899,
were raised in rural environments: Haines and Mason in Maryland,
Corwin in Michigan, and Swisher (from old Virginia stock) in West
Virginia. Three of them, Corwin, Haines, and Swisher, were sons of
farmers. All but one of them went to small, private colleges (two in
Pennsylvania, one in West Virginia); Corwin, went to a state
school, the University of Michigan, where, as an undergraduate at
the end of the nineteenth century, he listened to the lectures of the
strict constitutional traditionalist, Andrew McLaughlin. All emigrated from their small, relatively isolated undergraduate environments to more cosmopolitan, and in three cases, decidedly urban,
centers of graduate training-Haines to Columbia in the first decade of the twentieth century; Corwin, during the same decade, to a
Ph.D. at the University of Pennsylvania in history, not political
science, under the tutelage of the venerable historian, John Bach
McMaster (Corwin despite his historian's training taught political
science for almost all of his career); Swisher to Brookings in Washington, D.C. in the late 1920's; and Mason to Princeton in the early
twenties where he studied under Corwin. Their teaching careers
progressed rapidly, and three of them were established relatively
2. The brief biographical data gathered in the following paragraphs was gleaned from
the following sources: Corwin: Mason, In Memoriam, 57 AMwn. POL. Sci. Rav. 789 (1963);
Obituary,N.Y. Times, April 30, 1963, at 35, col. 1. Haines: 42 NAT'L. CYCLOPEDIA OF AMEmCAN BIOGRAPHY 599 (1958); Dykstra & Grant, Obituary,43 AMER. POL. Sci. REv. 106 (1949).
Mason: WHO's WHO IN AMERICA 2170 (1980). Swisher: NAT'L CYCLOPEDIA OF AMEmCAN BioGRAPHY, Vol. J 294 (1964); Obituary,N.Y. Times, June 16, 1968, at 68, col. 3. As far as I have
been able to determine, no standard biographical work has appeared on any of them.
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quickly at the universities where they were to spend most of their
lives-Corwin, immediately at Princeton, Mason almost immediately at Princeton through the Corwin connection, Swisher, first
for five years at Columbia, then at Johns Hopkins, and Haines,
who took a little longer to settle eventually at the University of
California at Los Angeles.
What can we discern from the patterns? I hope not that the
sons of farmers are slated to become constitutional historians-I
would not want to wish that on the sons. What is apparent though
is first, the general movement from rural to eastern urban environments, where the established centers of learning were at the turn
of the century, and second, the predominance of two universities-Columbia and Princeton-whose influence is crucial to understanding why these men chose to write on what they wrote and
with whatever discernment they brought to their tasks. Haines was
trained at Columbia, and Swisher taught there two decades later
at the outset of his academic career; Corwin and Mason were
permanent fixtures at Princeton from 1905. Further, two significant intellectual figures in the story of the rise of political science,
Frank Goodnow at Columbia and Woodrow Wilson at Princeton,
reflected in that relatively new academic discipline the major contours of the social and political movement of Progressivism. Haines
and Corwin worked with Goodnow and Wilson and were thus exposed to many of the debates about the direction the nascent discipline ought to take. Mason and Swisher were only a decade or so
removed from this legacy.
The story of Progressivism in America is well-known." Though
a multi-faceted movement, it was primarily concerned with reforming American government and making it more responsive and
more democratic, and appealed primarily for a return to the values
of an American past. Progressives were alarmed by the American
3. Some of the standard interpretative works from different angles of vision include: R.
ABRAMS, CONSERVATISM IN A PROGRESSIVE ERA: MASSACHUSETTS POLITICS, 1900-1912 (1964);
S. HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 18901920 (1964); S. HAYS, RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM, 1885-1914 (1957); S. HAYS, CONSERVATION
AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920
(1959); R. HOPSTADTER, THE AGE OP REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR (1955); G. KOLKO, THE
TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM, 1900-1916 (1963); G. KOLKO, RAILROAD AND REGULATION, 18771916 (1965); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900-1913 (1968);

R. WIEBE, BUSINESSMEN AND REFORM: A STUDY OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT (1962); R.
WEEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920 (1967).
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present with its enormous concentrations of wealth and economic
power, labor strife, potential for radicalism, the unsettling effect of
the influx of immigrants, and widespread corruption. However, the
rise of the discipline of political science and its response to Progressivism, is not a generally well-known tale. Therefore, a more
detailed word need be said about that interaction and where our
subjects fit into it.
Early work in political science, from 1880 to about 1900, was
dominated by John W. Burgess, professor of political science at
Columbia.4 As a perceptive observer has recently noted, "[flor over
thirty years, Burgess' school, his journal (the Political Science
Quarterly), his students, and their students dominated the study
of American government and politics." Yet it is difficult for the
late twentieth century mind to grasp the attractiveness of Burgess'
theories and work. He believed in an essentially racial theory of
civilization-that the Teutonic/Aryan race was especially blessed
with the capacity of civil government, that the state was, through
"the forms and structures" of "tangible government," the embodiment of some sort of mystical and ideal "spirit of a people," by
which he seemed to mean certain culturally determined values,
and that one could trace the evolution of these institutions in the
constitutional history and political theory of Western thought. In
short, he represented in America the German historical school of
scholarship. His counterpart in the field of history was Herbert
Baxter Adams, who practiced his art at Johns Hopkins.6 And it
was Adams under whom Woodrow Wilson learned history and
against whom he rebelled. At Columbia, Frank Goodnow led the
charge against Burgess. At stake was the question of what would
be the scope of the subject area for the new discipline, and within
4. The account in the following paragraphs relies heavily on Frisch, 'The Hope of Democracy': Urban Theorists, Urban Reform, and American Political Culture in the Progressive Period (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Organization of American
Historians, New Orleans, April 13, 1979, forthcoming in POL. Sci. Q.). For the rise of the
discipline, see generally A. Somrr & J. TAuENHAus, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMICAN POLrICAL SCIENCE (1967); for what happened at Columbia, see R. HoxIE, A HISTORY OF THE
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: COLUMBIA UNVERsrY (1955).
5. Frisch, supra note 4, at 4 (emphasis in original).
6. Id. at 3-6. See also J. HERBST, THE GERMAN HISTORICAL SCHOOL IN AmMCAN SCHOL-

ARSHIP: A STUDY IN THE TRANSFER OF CULTURE (1965); Cunningham, The German Historical World of Herbert Baxter Adams: 1874-1876, 68 J. AM. HIST. 261 (1981); Gordon, J.
Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography,10 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 9, 14-15 (1975).
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this, what would be the content and contours of the American version of democracy.
The first battles were fought over, of all things, the role in
American political life of the city. Why the city? The cities, rife
with corruption, were teeming with the immigrants that made Burgess squirm; they were the seedbed of foreign ideas (for which
read, socialism), and the natural Progressive setting to determine if
the uniquely American experiment could work. The city was where
American democracy would live or die-the city was the last great
American hope. And Wilson and Goodnow did not think that the
hope was in any way related to John Burgess' view of the world.
The "spirit of the state" was not what was important-what was
important were local administrative units, microcosms of self-government, where it could be shown that government could and
would function. The cities were not to be conceived of as organic,
idealized, autonomous entities which were designed merely to deliver services and control order. Cities were interconnected with
other aspects of society, not isolated. Wilson and Goodnow thought
that the social and economic roots of society's problems should be
recognized and attacked. Governmental powers should be used to
address social problems, and to infuse the local political process
with the necessary tools to foster real structural change.
Goodnow's work on city government and Wilson's work on administration show that their vision of the role of political science
was suffused with Progressive ideas.7 Both were pragmatic, practical, and activist-and also on the cutting edge of empiricism. They
sought to develop a political theory which would provide a modern,
democratic example-a symbol. Urban reform would, in a sense,
legitimate the new political science, and confirm the importance of
the city to the new political vision. The city would become the very
representative administrative organ of a responsive, effective, pluralist democracy.
Though the tangible focus of their discipline was the city,
their obsession was clearly democracy. Why? In 1905, Jane Addams had spelled out the alternative threat: "The rapid growth of
the socialist party in all crowded cities." She had been equally
blunt about why the threat was present; it was, she wrote, "largely
due to the recognition of those primary human needs which the
7. For Goodnow, see Frisch, supra note 4, at 11-16; for Wilson, id. at 6-7, 11-12.
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well established governments so stupidly ignore." And she had eloquently concluded: "All that devotion, all of that speculative philosophy .

.

. concerning the real issues of life, could, of course,

easily be turned into a passion for self-government and the development of a natural life, if we were truly democratic from the modern evolutionary standpoint."'
This was the environment in which our first political scientists-Corwin, Haines, Mason, and Swisher-were trained, and
they carried many of these same concerns from the urban reform
movements to their chosen subdisciplines of constitutional law and
constitutional history. And just like their teachers, their own writing reflects the debate underway at the time of their arrival in the
discipline, though it focuses instead on the role of the Supreme
Court in American life. This focus was deliberate; in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Supreme Court was actively reviewing much Progressive legislation and, more often than
not, declaring it unconstitutional." To Progressives, nonelective
judges were, in mechanical and formalistic opinions, overturning
social legislation promulgated by popularly-elected legal assemblies
which sought to redress social grievances. These constitutional
scholars found that practice intolerable; for them "judicial review"
became the battlecry under which to rally, in much the same way
the urban reformers, their teachers, had taken up the cause of the
city. Judicial review lacked legitimacy because it was antidemocratic and interfered with the expressed will of the people.
The Court was unresponsive to the needs and desires of the people; it was, therefore, compromising the great democratic experiment. Thus Corwin, Haines, Mason, and Swisher at various times
adopted a kind of reformist-realist critique of formal legal and institutional forces that they thought stood in the way of progress.10
A detailed examination of the work of the political scientists is
beyond the scope of this article. A few general impressions will suffice for now. In 1914, Haines published his influential work on the
8. Quoted in Frisch, supra note 4, at 18.
9. There are numerous accounts of this phenomenon, some of the older chestnuts still
retain the power of some of their insights. See, e.g., R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME
COURT, chs. 5

and 6 (1960); A.

PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES

OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960).

10. The thrust of this critique is captured quite well in Belz, The Realist Critique of
Constitutionalismin The Era of Reform, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 288 (1971).
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American Doctrine of JudicialSupremacy in which he complained
of the growth of judicial power and its alignment with conservative
political and economic causes. Haines linked the lack of political
democracy with the Supreme Court's protection of powerful economic interests. Yet his solution, in his revised edition of 1932, was
to suggest somewhat paradoxically that courts engage in "social engineering" to remedy social problems-absolutely in the face of
and in conflict with his seeming concern with the antidemocratic
bias of active courts.1 1
Haines, for most of his career, was also faithful to his original
training under Goodnow at Columbia, merging his academic life
with a Progressive's commitment to urban reform and efficient
government. Between 1912 and 1914, he was executive secretary of
the League of Pacific Northwest Municipalities and as late as 1939
served as a Commissioner of the Department of Water and Power
in Los Angeles. His commitment to good government was founded
in a faith in "majority rule, direct legislation, and public ownership. 1 2 He believed that law reflected social and economic
forces-he was influenced heavily in this regard by Charles Beard
from that very same Columbia political science department. 3 And
Beard, one year before he published his influential and controversial Economic Interpretationof the Constitution in 1913, wrote a
book entitled American City Government. Beard, of whom Corwin
was very critical,1 4 pointed the way in an even further departure
from Burgess and the traditional model. Enough so that Andrew
McLaughlin, Corwin's old mentor at Michigan, felt constrained in
1914 in his presidential address to the American Historical Association, to complain that "many of us are even now looking out upon
the field of constitutional history as a branch and only a branch of
economic history." 115 Haines was not as alarmed.
Corwin, though quite critical of what he conceived to be reactionary Supreme Court decisions, was the most troubled of the
group about what he perceived to be the erosion of "objective, ra11.
12.
13.
see R.
14.

See Belz's discussion of this problem, id. at 304-05.
Dykstra & Grant, Obituary,supra note 2, at 107.
On Beard, and particularly his role in the Columbia political science department,
HOFSTADrER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 179-181 (Vintage ed. 1970).
Corwin, Book Review, 7 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 330 (1913). (A review of C. BEARD, THE
(1912).)
Quoted in Belz, supra note 10, at 298.

SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

15.

19811
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tional principles" in constitutional adjudication. In his view, simple politically or economically expedient formulas could not be
substituted for fundamental principles. He was therefore not totally opposed to judicial review. 16
Swisher saw the problem in his characteristically succinct way.
"The current and fundamental question about the process," he
wrote relatively late in his career, "is whether restraint in terms of
restrictions . . . is vital to the democratic process, or whether it
goes so far as to prevent achievement by government of the ends
which society is seeking more and more to achieve through politi1
cal organization. 7
It would be, however, missing the point to characterize the focus of these men's scholarship as the legitimacy of judicial review.
The major intellectual problem for all of these constitutional scholars, the one which obsessed them, was the scope and viability of
American democracy. How to insure that the people's will was expressed and regarded, how to guarantee that power was not
usurped, especially in the face of what they conceived to be static
constitutional interpretation based on outdated principles-that
was the question. Yet, as they strove to answer this question as
their careers unfolded, they were ineluctably caught in certain tensions, dilemmas, and contradictions. They tried to remain consistent but found it increasingly difficult to do so as they remembered
the lessons of the past. An example is Haines, at the advent of the
New Deal, calling for judges to be "social engineers" only twenty
years after urging, during the Progressive period, a severely limited
use of judicial review. But while they struggled for that consistency, they had an absolutely abiding, burning, inspiring faith in
one central ideal: democracy. That is what makes them appear, on
an emotional if not always on an intellectual level, so attractive.
They had a faith which many modern constitutional scholars seem
to lack.
Sometimes, however, they appeared incoherent-Haines and
Corwin in particular. And they were so, I suggest, because for all of
16. For analysis of Corwin's work, see Newton, Edward S. Corwin and American Constitutional Law, 14 J. PUB. L. 198 (1965); Mason & Garvey, Introduction to E. CORWIN,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY ESSAYS ix-xxiii (1964); Loss, Introduction to 1 CORWIN
ON THE CONSTITUTION 17-43 (R. Loss ed. 1981).
17. C. SWISHER, THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 24
(1946).
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their faith, they basically misconceived the central problem in
American life. They understood that what drove their interest in
linking democratic theory to the American judiciary was their concern for the economic and social welfare of the polity. And they
thought they could submerge the problems of American economic
and social life by returning to the fundamental strength of American political life, its democratic character. But focusing as they did
on democracy could postpone only for so long the confrontation
between competing visions of economic welfare. What they missed,
what brought the note of incoherence to their scholarship, was that
the problem was not democracy; the problem was capitalism.
The scholarship of Corwin, Haines, Mason, and Swisher seems
so vital today because its authors believed in something; yet paradoxically in the act of believing they were implicitly beginning the
process of stripping away the garb of democracy to reveal the contradictions of capitalism. By revealing the inequalities within the
social order and attempting to remedy them, they paved the way
for an examination of the articulated and unarticulated premises
upon which the order was based. The task of reassurance they set
out to accomplish by redirecting democratic theory was in the long
run undermined by the process of delineating the painful truths
they were forced to confront in order to accomplish their work.
The coherence of democratic theory suffered in the rush to examine, embrace, and remedy social dislocation. As a result, what
eventually emerged was a full-scale debate centering on the contours of capitalism and a self-conscious investigation of social conditions, within which democracy, the legitimating political theory,
was submerged.
II.

The careers of the immigrants replicated in the field of law
much of what the lives of the progressive political scientists revealed. Frankfurter, Bickel, and Gunther represent three generations,18 but in a sense, they are closer to each other than the generations of political scientists are because Gunther and Bickel were
very closely tied to Frankfurter's image and example.
18. Frankfurter is of Corwin's and Haines' generation; Gunther and Bickel are a third
generation, if you count Mason and Swisher as the intermediate group.
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Frankfurter's life is now almost legendary: 19 the emigration
from Vienna at the age of twelve, the ancestry derived from rabbis
and scholars (a familiar pattern in Jewish intellectual and academic circles-in the context of this discussion it also includes
Bickel and my father), the enormous academic success at City College, followed by the conquest (as a student) of the Harvard Law
School, public service under Henry L. Stimson, the return to
Harvard as a law professor, involvement in politics and public affairs (Sacco and Vanzetti, of course, and writing for the New Republic), his maintenance of a pipeline between Cambridge and
Washington (comprised of his students who became Supreme
Court law clerks for Holmes and Brandeis), his relationship with
FDR, work, and vicarious work through his former students, in the
New Deal, and finally his appointment as associate justice of the
United States Supreme Court. Felix Frankfurter was the assimilationist's dream come true. Accepted at almost all levels of American life to which he aspired, he gained access to power and influence essentially unchallenged, and was appropriately rewarded for
his accomplishments. His life was the reflection of America as a
land of opportunity. And Frankfurter almost never looked back,
except to bask in the reflected glory of having made it in America.
What lessons did he learn from his own success? Basically,
that America's promise was in her democratic impulses, which created opportunity for anyone to strive. His work started with that
premise and his scholarly writing and his career as a judge showed
that he never departed from that idea. And like the political scientists, he also never questioned that belief. There was a difference
though. Unlike his rural-bred contemporaries, Frankfurter constantly worked to remind everyone that he was both an American
and that he was socially desirable. He was consumed with his need
to know, or at least be acquainted with, the "right" people. In this
way, he is reminiscent of Brandeis' early career, another Jew in an
alien society, late nineteenth-century Boston, and Brandeis' enormously complex relationship with Brahmin culture. Brandeis, en19. The basic biographical outline, with some interesting interpretive insights, may be
gleaned from H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981); Lash, A Brahmin of
the Law: A BiographicalEssay, in FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 3-98 (1975).

These may be supplemented with care by the printed transcripts of Frankfurter's own musings on his life (recorded by the Columbia Oral History Project) and available in H. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES (1960).
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dowed with a formidable intangible called "character," made his
peace with it. 20 While Frankfurter felt that he owed full allegiance

to a political and social system that allowed him to rise to the top,
he also apparently thought he had a lot to overcome. Suffice it to
say that he was never as happy as he was the year he spent at
Oxford in the early 19301s.21
Frankfurter's work reflects his absolute faith in the democratic
process. 2 For him, as for Haines, Corwin, Mason, and Swisher, the
key question was how to accommodate the implications of judicial
supremacy, that is, judicial review, with democratic theory. His answer seemed to be that courts should retreat. Judicial self-restraint
was the appropriate judicial philosophy because it allowed legislatures to become "laboratories" for the democratic experiments reflecting the will of the people. Judges should not intervene and impose their views on this process. Instead, judges were to defer to
the powers allocated elsewhere in a democratic society and avoid
deciding constitutional questions whenever possible. The avoidance techniques, picked up from Brandeis and later more fully developed by Bickel,25 would guarantee one thing-that the essence
of democracy was and should remain in its process. So when he
became a Supreme Court justice, mindful of the way the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Court had interfered with Progressive legislation, and the way the early New Deal court had upset early New Deal legislation, he preached the gospel (perhaps, in
a way an inapt metaphor, but not entirely) of deference and inactivity. The contrast is very striking; at the pinnacle of his career,
he became powerless and confined in the role he assumed as the
ultimate reward for his competence. The irony-Frankfurter's embrace of judicial deference at this stage of his career-reflected his
20.

See A.

GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON

(1980).

21. "Life that year was rich, abundant and stimulating. It was very happy for both of
us at Oxford. I should sum it all up by saying that it was the fullest year my wife and I
spent-the amplest and most civilized." Quoted in Phillips, supra note 19, at 277.
22. The literature on Frankfurter as judge is quite enormous. See, e.g., C. JACOBS, JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1961); W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER:

CONFLICT IN THE COURT

(1961);

FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE JUDGE (W.

Mendelson ed.

1964); FELIX FRANKFURTER

ON THE SUPREME COURT (P. Kurland ed. 1970); P. KURLAND, MR.
JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION (1971); H. THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER,
SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH (1960); G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 317-68 (1978).

23. For Brandeis, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring); for Bickel's approval of Brandeis' techniques, see A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 2 (1957).
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deep ambivalence at his having arrived and his fear that it would
be somehow swept away.2 4 Now he could reward democracy and
leave it unfettered. Process guaranteed order; theorizing about social justice was delegated elsewhere in a democratic society, not in
courts.
Of Frankfurter, it was written that
it is relevant... to remark on the fact that Felix Frankfurter-a member to
be sure of a cultivated family with strong intellectual traditions-started life
in the United States as an immigrant Jewish boy .... Such a career is a

tribute to the personal gifts and power of the man, and in a secondary way
25
also to the society which permitted itself to benefit from those gifts. ...

The author of that passage on Frankfurter emphasizing the new
homeland's acceptance of the immigrant-the summing up of the
assimilationist's success-is, significantly, Alexander Bickel. The
excerpt, though about Frankfurter, is just as descriptive I think, of
Bickel, for Bickel clearly aspired to wear Frankfurter's mantle.
Bickel arrived in this country in 1939 at age fourteen, having
emigrated with his family from Romania.26 His career replicated
Frankfurter's: 7 City College, then the Harvard Law School, followed by a Supreme Court clerkship with Frankfurter, and then an
academic career-at Yale instead of Harvard. (The parallels even
extend to Bickel's contributions to the New Republic.)
Bickel grew up in New York in what someone has called "a
24. For a suggestion as to how the assimilationist's impulse may have affected his per-

ceptions of constitutional issues as a judge, see Danzig, How Questions Begot Answers in
Felix Frankfurter'sFirst Flag Salute Opinion, 1977 S. CT. REv. 257.
25. Bickel, Justice Frankfurterat Seventy-five, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 18, 1957, at 7. In
the same essay, Bickel wrote the following describing Henry L. Stimson, one of Frankfurter's mentors: "He was nearly to perfection the public servant who knows how to strike
the balance between the duty of deference to the popular will, and the responsibility of
guiding our people along paths of reason and decency, conforming with the traditions and
aspirations of our society." Id. at 8.
The suggestion seems to be that Frankfurter used Stimson as a role model-this is even
more striking, perceptive, and revealing of both immigrants-Frankfurter and Bickel-in
describing and explaining the nature of some of their assimilationist impulses.
26. The barebones of the biographical data has been gathered from a variety of sources:
Harrison, Alexander M. Bickel: 1924-1974, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 23, 1974, at 7; Bork, A
Rememberance of Alex Bickel, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 18, 1975, at 21; Obituary, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 8, 1974, at 42, col. 1.
27. Needless to say, the parallels have not gone unnoticed. See, e.g., Purcell, Alexander
M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution,11 HARv. C. L.-C. R. L. REv. 521, 528 (1976).
In addition to this incidental observation, the Purcell essay contains much of interest on
Bickel's work.
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Jewish intellectual salon. '2 8 His father, Schlomo Bickel, was the
figure around whom the circle revolved. He was a Yiddish essayist
and literary critic, but most interestingly, Schlomo Bickel had been
a successful lawyer in Bucharest before coming to America. In New
York he abandoned the practice of law (it was not always easy for
immigrant lawyers to reestablish their careers here, though it was
possible), and devoted himself to a life of Jewish culture. In a very
revealing essay, entitled "Three Generations," Schlomo described
his heritage and family. His father, Alexander's grandfather, went
from Europe not to America, but to Israel, apparently finding the
image of America unsatisfactory, and his brother, Alexander's uncle, chose to remain in Europe, as a doctor and also as a philosopher, justifying assimilationist impulses, until emigrating late in
life to Canada. The philosopher-uncle is quoted as saying that
I can never drain away the stream of Jewishness that my inherited way of life

and my upbringing and my education have left in me. But I must confess to
you that if I have a son I shall bring him up free from all religion, and do all I
can to give him the chance of assimilating to the surrounding people, particularly to the dominant people of the state.2 9

Bickel's father did not share his view-hence his transformation
after arriving in New York from lawyer to Yiddish literary figure in
an essentially inhospitable environment, keeping the cultural candle burning in an enclave. Alex Bickel himself seemed to choose
his uncle's and Frankfurter's path.
As a student at Harvard, Bickel came under two significant
influences.3 0 One, the Frankfurter strain, was quite explicit in the
curriculum and in the inbred faculty narcissisticly reflecting its
own image. The other strain was less explicitly represented on the
faculty and in the classroom, but it nevertheless steadily shaped
debate in legal academic circles, even though it was often criticized
at Harvard. This was the fallout from the Columbia and Yalebased legal realist movement of the late 1920's and 1930's. The legal realists maintained that law was at its base infused with values,
often the subjective social or economic values of judges, or more
widespread, unexpressed endemic ideological values permeating society, Law was not value free-it was contingent, and time bound,
28.
29.
grateful
30.

Bork, supra note 26, at 21.
Bickel, Three Generations-A Memoir, 34 COMMENTARY 324, 331 (1962). I am
to Jerold Auerbach for drawing my attention to this essay.
See Purcell, supra note 27, at 522-27.
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and situational. 1
Bickel understood and accepted, at some level, the basic realist position, but did not concede that law, therefore, was likely to
be arbitrary or capricious. For him, the question was what kind of
coherent intellectual formulation could be devised that was true to
the Frankfurter strain and that also took account of the realists'
insights. Bickel's immigrant experience told him, particularly in
light of the Europe he had left behind, that law was too important
in bracing the social order to be abandoned to expediency. And so
he sought to create a universe in which the rule of law, democracy,
order, and social needs could co-exist. In the judicial realm, this
meant a process-oriented judiciary that was loathe to reach difficult and complex decisions, that respected institutional competence, that relied on reason (known as reasoned elaboration), and
that only made major and critical judgments when it could be sure,
and only when it was sure, that the judgment was in line with the
fundamentally shared views and values of society-the last point,
of course, being the one which Bickel isolated as one of Frankfurter's strengths.
Bickel's judicial philosophy stemmed from a political insight
about America, and not a fully worked out political theory or philosophy-lawyers rarely have political theories or philosophies. But
Bickel did have an insight about the operative implications of democracy that triggered his belief in the passive virtues of judging.
He believed that legislatures might occasionally, in the heat of the
moment, respond to what he called "expediency." As legislative
bodies, they are "ill equipped" to deal with "a coherent body of
principled rules." Courts, he contended, are better able to deal
with principles than legislatures are. In the fullness of time, courts
drawing on reason and society's "enduring values" are more likely
capably to judge society's needs, especially if legislatures have
caved in to expediency. Bickel, therefore, since he pitted expediency against principle, was for a limited form of judicial review,
even though it had "counter-majoritarian" or "antidemocratic" implications. But because it did, it must be severely restricted. The
31. On the realists, see Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BuFFALo L. REv. 459 (1979); White, From Sociological
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudenceand Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century
America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972); Purcell, American Jurisprudencebetween the Wars, 75
AM. HIST. REv. 424 (1969).
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way to arrest its antidemocratic tendencies was to assure that the
judging be apolitical, neutral, objective, and reasoned-in other
words, as process-oriented as possible. Courts were only justified in
acting on principles based on shared or fundamental values on
which society had agreed. 2
Bickel, then, was pulled at least two ways at once: 'towards
process and towards acting on principle. Why judges should or
should not act, or when, was not always clearly delineated. Being
capable of identifying American shared values upon which to act
was important to the immigrant's mission-a sign of true acceptance and adaptation. Yet eventually, he settled on process as the
ultimate, objective principle: indeed he worshiped as one of the
cult of craft and process. For courts the focus on procedure created
the appearance of neutrality and disinterestedness, allowing society's forces to play out their battles elsewhere. One can almost discern the spectre of Naziism and Stalinism behind the belief in order and process. Still the tension was the same for Bickel as it had
been for the political scientists and for Frankfurter, between the
necessity of maintaining social consent and majority rule-democracy-and the potentially antidemocratic results of judicial review.
For the native-born Progressive political scientist, the city was
the hope and symbol-and the constitutional historians among
them decreed that the democratic exercise should not be hampered
by courts. For the immigrants, America itself was the embodiment
of the hope-likewise, the last great hope. Their faith was placed
in a culture that at least theoretically could assimilate and accept
s
them as no culture had before
32.

For a statement of Bickel's views, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

16-28 (1962).
33. In order to offer additional evidence of at least the demographic point, Gerald Gunther and my father, I suppose, should fill out the picture, though both fall in a slightly
different place than the Frankfurter-Bickel model. Gunther, born in Germany, emigrated in
1938 when 11 years old, attended Brooklyn College instead of City, then the Harvard Law
School, clerked for Learned Hand, and then was selected to clerk for Frankfurter. At the
last minute he was donated as a clerk by a generous Frankfurter to the new, incoming Chief
Justice, Earl Warren-I'm sure a disappointment to Gunther. I suspect that the fact he
became a gift from Frankfurter to Warren ought to have been an enormous compliment to
Gunther, since Frankfurter, ever vigilent and always manipulative, almost certainly executed the transaction from ulterior motives. He no doubt wanted to insure that Warren
would remain completely orthodox, and repulse all suggestions of activist heresy and
thought as the thoroughly trained Gunther would stand as the guardian of the proper values. So much for the best laid plans, to which Bickel's critical attacks on the Warren Court
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The central formative experiences of the Jewish immigrant
constitutional lawyers then are clear-the intellectually stimulating and inspiring environments of City College and Brooklyn College, the Harvard Law School, (these institutions were to them
what Columbia and Princeton were to the political scientists), the
model of Frankfurter, the quest for assimilation, the paradoxes of
legal realism, and ultimately the promise, in a troubled world, of
American democracy, their lives a constant reminder of its hope
and sanctuary. It is not too difficult to understand the passion
which drove them to write of this last hope-the promise of democracy-and make of it an article of faith. It is a faith totally
gone from almost all of today's relatively limited examples of constitutional scholarship.
II.
Why the present spate of insignificant constitutional scholarship is upon us is traceable, I think, to two general causes: one, in
the political science camp, the other, in the lawyers' camp-both
related to each other. The political scientists' interest in constitutional law has waned, in part ironically, because of the success and
perceptiveness of the original contributions of scholars like Haines
and Corwin. As one commentator has noted,
[s]keptical toward constitutionalism [these scholars] ultimately denied the
significance of constitutional principles, theories, and rules as causative forces
in history. They concluded . . . that constitutional issues were not real isFor if constitutional issues were but a superficial manifestation of
sues ....

economic or social reality, it was understandable that scholars should study
4
reality at first hand, rather than once removed in its legalistic reflections.'

And so the social sciences slowly turned to ways to measure a variety of phenomena that would tell us about how things worked,
will attest. See generally A. BicKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
(I do not mean to suggest either that Gunther was seduced by Warren or that Warren was
uninfluenced by his clerk.) In any event, Gunther was exposed to many of the same influences as Bickel, with one addition-a number of years of political science at Brooklyn College under Samuel J. Konefsky, himself a product of Brooklyn College, and also the political
science department at Columbia University, but alas, an immigrant political scientist, and
not a lawyer. At Brooklyn College, Gunther was my father's research assistant where he
contributed some important work to a book, edited by my father, on, need I have to say it,
Felix Frankfurter. THE CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER (S. Konefsky
ed. 1949).
34. Belz, supra note 10, at 305.
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what caused or better yet, did not cause social phenomenon-the
efflorescence of empiricism. On the political science/constitutional
law side, these neutral appearing searches turned increasingly behavioristic, and measured all sorts of things. The principle of constitutionalism in a democracy, so central to the scholars of the
early part of the century, was easily lost to political realism.
On the legal side, a similar development occurred. For a time
the immigrants picked up the banner of democracy bequeathed to
them by the political scientists. But the root of the demise of constitutional scholarship in law likewise can be traced to a confrontation of sorts with realism-legal realism. The realism of legal realism dictated some recognition of the subjectivity of values, and of
the impact of social forces. Objective principles were thus no
longer readily identifiable. "Because the various sectoral interests
asserted themselves in the legislative process," it has been noted,
"it yielded acceptable results, not because the results were consistent with principles of justice, but because they were produced by
an acceptable process.

'3 5

If society could not agree on a substan-

tive meanihg of justice, at least scholars could focus on its procedural setting. And so process was substituted as an acceptable form
of principle, with the result that democratic constitutional scholarship ultimately chose to ignore the social and economic questions
which were at the root of the Progressives' theorizing about democracy and thus central also to the Frankfurter strain of legal constitutional theory. Justice was not to be mentioned in the same
sentence with law. Pluralistic democracy turned away from attempting to redress substantial inequalities created in a capitalist
economy. In fact, pluralism tended to reinforce substantive inequality for the climate of process encouraged overlooking the social
and economic roots of inequality.
In recent years the debate has slowly turned still farther away
from democracy. As liberal legalism retreated into process in order
to avoid its confrontation with social and economic realities, and
eschewed activism because it could not identify shared moral principles, its scholarship of legitimation became increasingly contradictory and incoherent. Modern constitutional scholarship in the
35. Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1307, 1314 (1979).
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law schools illustrates the incoherence.

6

It is unilluminating, for-

mal, and increasingly divorced from its social base. Unlike the
scholarship of Frankfurter and Bickel, it has little passion, little
faith. For the most part, modern scholars are still elaborating, as
normal scientists do, the old, conventional paradigm, without
much sense of or reference to what so animated the original group
of contributors. The direction, wrong or not, of the older group is
far more understandable when placed in its historical context.
If there is hope, I believe it lies in a still younger group now
working in the field, some of whom seem to believe that the heart
of the problem is capitalism. 37 Democratic capitalism is only one
version of democracy. The economic soil in which democracy is
nurtured gives it its substantive meaning of justice. To that extent,
the pluralist constitutional theory upon which the immigrant law
professors based their theory of law has been found lacking by
some. Once again, as in the case of political science, it is the roots
of economic and social reality which have attracted the attention,
but with a difference. These younger legal scholars, unlike the empirical political scientists, seem ready to address the problem of
trying to establish a substantive basis of justice using concepts and
standards that do not accept traditional economic or social constructs. Sometimes.they are simply critical of the older tradition (a
good place to start), and sometimes they are painfully utopian.
They are adept at stripping away the contradictions of process-oriented jurisprudence and slowly they are beginning to build an alternative political vision of constitutional law-one that does not
shirk from puzzling out a meaningful conception of justice, even if
this conception rejects earlier work and the conditions of society
upon which it was based. This is not a shell game to them. What I
like most about them is their passion and their faith.
36. For an important article on this problem, see Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE
L.J. 1063 (1981).
37. In this group, I would place Paul Brest, Alan Freeman, Richard Parker, and Mark
Tushnet though I am sure that not all of them would necessarily wholeheartedly share or
endorse the diagnosis of the problem offered at this point in the text. See Brest, supra note
36; Freeman, Legitimizing Racial DiscriminationThrough AntidiscriminationLaw: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978); Parker, The Past of
ConstitutionalTheory-and its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981); Tushnet, supra note
35; Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributionsof John Hart Ely to ConstitutionalTheory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980); Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411 (1981).
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If my passion has a source, I think it may be reflected in the
spirit captured by a poem with which I would like to close-a
poem whose passion belies the fact that it was written by a law
professor, Saul Touster, in the 1960's. It is entitled "The Statue of
Liberty."
Stunned
by the immaculate skyline
of your throat,
my grandfather paused,
gathered what strengtfi he had
and climbed steerage and thighs
into the tourist air.
Here at your sea-washed hem
he fell
under the shadow of your earlobes
dazzled
by an outrageous chandelier.
Gulled of his bare belongings
he bathed in the sink
after the soup greens,
watched the paint peel
and smelled in Victorian gas cocks
something dangerous.
And yet for you, America,
the elbows of his black serge shone
and the seaweed in his beard
his love
as if he had discovered you.
America!
Thief!
Give me back
my grandfather's eyes!38

38. S. TousTER, STILL LIVES AND OTHER LivEs, 25-26 (1966). I am very grateful to James
Atleson for bringing this poem to my attention. After reading a draft of this lecture, he
suggested that the poem might be a fitting way to conclude the piece. Reprinted by permission of the University of Missouri Press. Copyright 1966 by the Curators of the University
of Missouri.'

